Crimea’s Water Woes as an Impetus for Russian Aggression and Comparisons to California’s Embattled Water Management System During Drought

I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE NORTH CRIMEAN CANAL

The Canal was completed by 1975 when Crimea was part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.1 Relevant here, the Canal channels water from Ukraine’s stretch of the Dnieper River to Crimea’s arid northern region.2 At 1,367 miles long, the Dnieper River is one of the longest rivers in Europe, flowing from east of Moscow, through Belarus and Ukraine, and emptying into the Black Sea.3 Completion of the Canal, and the subsequent influx of water to northern Crimea, spurred rapid agricultural and industrial development in that region.4 Reports indicate that by 2014 Crimea was receiving an outstanding 80% of its total water supply from the Canal, 72% of which was used for agriculture and 10% for industrial purposes.5 Rice, a highly water-intensive crop that is also cultivated here in California, accounted for 60% of agricultural water use.6 Other crops cultivated by Crimea included grapes, maize, and soya.7 Crimea used Canal water to irrigate approximately 300,000 acres.8

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, control of this vital resource was given to Ukraine. It is managed by the State Water Agency of Ukraine, an agency of Ukraine’s central government.9

II. 2014 RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND IMPACTS ON CANAL FLOW

In February 2014, Russian military operatives illegally infiltrated Crimea. In March, the Russian military took total control of the region. On March 16, 2014, a highly contested election in Crimea returned predictable Soviet-style results, with 97% of Crimeans opting to join Russia.10 Even then, Crimeans cited Canal water as an important, unresolved issue.11

Ukraine responded swiftly by damming the Canal with sandbags and earthen structure in 2014, followed by a permanent concrete dam in 2017.12 Ukrainian authorities allege that in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation, Russia refused to pay for Crimea’s water, incurring massive debt. In addition, Ukraine alleged that the Canal needed repairs, and Russian occupiers made no effort to contribute to those costs.13 Russia responded by stating that Ukraine never negotiated with them over the price of water or the cost of repairs and that Ukraine was weaponizing a critical natural resource.14

III. WATER USAGE AND AVAILABILITY IN CRIMEA AND RUSSIA FROM 2014 TO 2022

Although reports vary, it appears that the loss of Canal water has negatively impacted northern Crimea’s agriculture, economy, and, increasingly, quality of life. Aspects of this situation may seem familiar to Californians who also rely on irrigated water, are accustomed to periods of extreme drought, and grapple with aging water infrastructure.

Satellite images from 2018 reflect increasing desertification in the region.15 Agricultural output has “plummeted” by as much as 85%. By 2017, rice production had ceased.16

To compensate, Crimeans increasingly rely on reservoirs, groundwater and precipitation. But as Californians understand, these sources are diminishing and unstable. 2020 was Crimea’s driest in 150 years. And groundwater resources, as Californians also know, are simple enough to tap but difficult to replenish.

Although a 2017 UN report concluded that drinking water was not affected by the loss of access to the Canal, that may no longer be true.17 Since April 2021, Crimeans report that water has been rationed to six hours a day (or less).18 And Crimeans report that the water that does come in is of low quality; aging pipelines have been cited as a factor.19 Making water withdrawals from low reservoirs could also be a cause. And Crimea’s population has doubled in recent years, putting additional pressure on the diminishing supply.20

On July 22, 2021, Russia filed a lawsuit in the UN Court of Human Rights to restore water delivery; the suit was dismissed two days later.21 Russia has proposed costly water infrastructure upgrades, such as digging deeper wells and a desalination plant.22 Russians are also trucking in containers of drinking water. But are these measures enough? Likely not. As Californians also understand, water projects are time-consuming to build and implement. Even if new water is made available immediately, it can take up to 15 years for soil to become arable again.23

IV. RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE AND SEIZURE OF THE CANAL

This article began with a question. Was the Russian invasion of Ukraine motivated by Crimea’s water woes? In a world increasingly impacted by climate change, competition for natural resources should always be a considered factor in cross-border conflicts. One expert has argued that “‘the canal issue strongly irritates Russia,’ as it both ‘increases the price of occupation’ and ‘decreases the popularity of the occupying power.’”24 The timing is also telling. One of Russia’s first acts in Ukraine was to destroy the concrete dam.25 The Canal began filling, anticipated to be usable in April 2022.26

V. THE FUTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

What’s next? Although the situation seems grim, it is at least possible that, ultimately, a water-sharing agreement could be part of a treaty settlement of the current Ukrainian/Russian conflict. The parties could form a joint technical committee with the authority to manage the Canal and manage needs among competing users. A joint technical committee is by nature intended to be apolitical, composed of representatives from each party. The parties share data on water usage and needs and development projects involving the watercourse.27

Although Crimea is not riparian (adjacent) to the Dnieper River, the concept could be extended. Crimean authorities should also re-evaluate their agricultural choices to focus on native and drought-tolerant crops. It may be far-fetched to assume that 60% of resumed Canal flow could be again appropriated to create rice paddies in an arid region.28 As California’s Mono Lake controversy made clear, the best source of new water may be the water you already have.29

Sara F. Dudley is a Board Member of the California Lawyers Association, Environmental Law Section. She is a staff attorney with the California Department of Pesticide Regulation. The statements in this article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect those of the Department.

Mo Roeckl-Navazio is a third-year law student and Juris Doctorate candidate at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of law. She is passionate about public policy and developed an interest in international water conflicts through her International Water Resource Law course.